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VIRTUES OF PRIORITY
MICHAEL HARRIS
In memory of Serge Lang
INTRODUCTION: ORIGINALITY AND OTHER VIRTUES
If hiring committees are arbiters of mathematical virtue, then letters of recom-
mendation should give a good sense of the virtues most appreciated by mathemati-
cians. You will not see “proves true theorems” among them. That’s merely part
of the job description, and drawing attention to it would be analogous to saying
an electrician won’t burn your house down, or a banker won’t steal from your ac-
count. I don’t know how electricians or bankers recommend themselves to one
another, but I have read a lot of letters for jobs and prizes in mathematics, and their
language is revealing in its repetitiveness. Words like “innovative” or “original”
are good, “influential” or “transformative” are better, and “breakthrough” or “deci-
sive” carry more weight than “one of the best.” Best, of course, is “the best,” but it
is only convincing when accompanied by some evidence of innovation or influence
or decisiveness.
When we try to answer the questions: what is being innovated or decided? who
is being influenced? – we conclude that the virtues highlighted in reference letters
point to mathematics as an undertaking relative to and within a community. This
is hardly surprising, because those who write and read these letters do so in their
capacity as representative members of this very community. Or I should say: mem-
bers of overlapping communities, because the virtues of a branch of mathematics
whose aims are defined by precisely formulated conjectures (like much of my own
field of algebraic number theory) are very different from the virtues of an area
that grows largely by exploring new phenomena in the hope of discovering simple
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the author had no intention of doing this, and the editors of Synthe`se saved the author the trouble by
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underlying principles (like much of the field of dynamical systems). The interpre-
tation of letters is left to the experts who apply not only their knowledge of their
field’s problems but also their familiarity with its value system. The same vocab-
ulary (original, influential, breakthrough) can thus apply to developments whose
character differs radically from one field to another. Some of the five mathemati-
cians who in 2014 were the first laureats of Silicon Valley’s Breakthrough Prizes
were honored for solving longstanding unsolved problems, while others defined
new classes of objects or raised original questions.
“Originality” is a virtue recognized across disciplinary boundaries. The ability
to understand and explain the details of another mathematician’s difficult proof is
undoubtedly admired as a virtue, but it’s almost never enough to get you a job. For
that you have to have brought something new to your field. This sounds so banal to
be unworthy of attention, but the philosophical problem is glaringly obvious: how
do we determine what is and is not new? Here the word new is used as shorthand for
the more complex notion of “bringing something new to your field.” Bare newness
is not enough. You can take 99 theorems in your field and string them together into
a single sentence connected by “and”s but that’s not new even if no one has ever
thought to do it before. As I already hinted, most true theorems are not new in the
virtuous sense I share with my fellow members of the hiring or prize committee.
Surely an element of taste is involved. It would be easiest to leave the clarifica-
tion of the virtue of newness to specialists in mathematical aesthetics, who are in
as difficult a position as any philosophers of mathematics. Specifically, they face
the difficulty common to all philosophers who deal with collective characteristics
of communities: how to distinguish the abstract (and presumably permanent) prin-
ciple they wish to emphasize from the (presumably transitory) idiosyncracies of
individual members of the community? Or more crudely, is a mathematical contri-
bution innovative because it is claimed to be so by influential or powerful members
of the community – the kind who are asked to write letters of recommendation?
Are reference letters just politics by other means?
These considerations can be left in the background when it has somehow come
to be accepted that answering a certain question – solving a famous conjecture, for
example – meets the community’s standards of importance. No member in good
standing of the community of geometers doubted that Grigori Perelman’s claim
to have solved the Poincare´ conjecture was new in the relevant sense, because (a)
the problem had long been considered central to the field; (b) no one had solved
it before Perelman; and (c) several teams of experts worked through the proof and
vouched for its correctness.
It is already more difficult to characterize the newness of a proof of a theorem
that was not long-awaited. Judgments in such cases are obtained as the result of a
process of implicit negotiation among those recognized as leaders within the com-
munity. On the basis of the standards invoked in such negotiations it should be
possible to form a reasonably coherent (or perhaps chaotic) picture of the commu-
nity’s virtues.
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Still more problematic are the mathematical ideas that express themselves in the
form of conjectures. It is at least conventionally believed that the goal of mathe-
matics is to produce proofs of theorems.1 So faced with such a proof, one at least
knows where the negotiation starts. The place of conjectures is much more am-
biguous: they can guide the thoughts of mathematicians for generations, or even
for centuries, but in principle a conjecture that turns out to be mistaken can also
vanish without a trace.2
THE MODULARITY CONJECTURE: WEIL’S 1967 PAPER
In 1967 Andre´ Weil published an 8-page article entitled “U¨ber die Bestimmung
Dirichletscher Reihen durch Funktionalgleichungen” – “On the determination of
Dirichlet series by means of functional equations.” The title was an intentional
allusion to a 1936 paper of Erich Hecke –“U¨ber die Bestimmung Dirichletscher
Reihen durch ihre Funktionalgleichung”: only one functional equation is used in
Hecke’s title and in his paper for determination, whereas the result of Weil’s pa-
per requires a collection of functional equations. The main theorem of the paper,
now known as Weil’s converse theorem, provides conditions that guarantee that a
Dirichlet series – an infinite series of the form
∑
n ann
−s, where s is a complex
variable – arises by a well-known procedure from a modular form of a specified
type. I will return to this last point later.
Weil must have considered his result respectable, because it was his contribu-
tion to a special issue of the journal Mathematische Annalen in honor of the 70th
birthday of Carl Ludwig Siegel, a mathematician whom Weil greatly admired. The
last page or so of his brief text was devoted to “reflections on the zeta functions of
elliptic curves that perhaps also merit some attention” (berlegungen u¨ber Zetafunk-
tionen elliptischer Kurven anknu¨pfen, die vielleicht auch einige Aufmerksamkeit
verdienen). These reflections came very close to, but stopped short of proposing
the conjecture, now solved, whose name has since been a matter of controversy:
Conjecture I. The zeta function of any elliptic curve with rational coefficients
coincides with the zeta function of a modular form of the type specified in the
main theorem of Weil’s paper.
I choose to formulate this sentence as a conjecture for the sake of clarity, and to
set the conjecture in boldface type, but Weil presented his “reflections” in normal
type. Moreover, instead of coming out and stating a conjecture, he explained that
this is sometimes the case – here he cited a result of Goro Shimura – but added that
“whether things always behave that way” appears for the moment to be problematic
(scheint im Moment noch problematisch zu sein) and may be recommended to the
interested reader as an exercise (mag dem interessierten Leser als U¨bungsaufgabe
empfohlen werden).
1However, William Thurston famously wrote that “The product of mathematics is clarity and
understanding. Not theorems, by themselves.” https://mathoverflow.net/posts/44213/revisions.
2The canonical reference for the role of conjecture within mathematical practice is still Barry
Mazur’s article on the subject: Mazur, B., Conjecture. Synthe`se, vol. 111, no. 2, 1997, pp. 197–210.
JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20117628.
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These last sentences came at the end of a paragraph that began with Weil’s very
strong hints in favor of believing Conjecture I: “On certain theoretical grounds
one may with reasonable certainty suspect”3 that something is true that entails the
claim, in view of the main result of the paper. This “suspicion” – in a rather stronger
form, mentioned in that same paragraph of Weil’s paper – soon was circulating
under the name of the Weil Conjecture. I will have to provide some background in
order to explain the nature of these hints, but for the moment let me focus on the
superficial aspect of the situation. Weil has drawn his readers’ attention to a series
of steps, some of them proved in his paper, some “reasonably certain,” leading to
the suspicion and, with another step that is “of course obvious to expect” (natu¨rlich
naheliegend zu erwarten), to the stronger form that will be explained in a moment.
LIGHTNING INTRODUCTION TO ELLIPTIC CURVES, MODULAR FORMS, AND
THEIR DIRICHLET SERIES
But first I had better review the mathematical notions invoked in the “suspicion.”
An elliptic curve with rational coefficients is a geometric objectE with number the-
oretic meaning: it is the set of solutions to a polynomial equation in two variables
of the form
(*) y2 = x3 + ax + b
where a and b are rational numbers (with the property that the polynomial on
the right-hand side of the equation has no multiple roots). A modular form is a
different kind of geometric object with a very different number-theoretic meaning.
To explain this, we consider the set of complex numbersH = {z = x+iy, y > 0}–
the upper half-plane in the complex plane. The 2× 2 matrices(
a b
c d
)
with determinant 1 form a group SL(2,Z) that acts on H by the formula
z 7→ az + b
cz + d
Whenever Γ is a subgroup of finite index in SL(2,Z), the quotient Γ\H can be
identified with a compact Riemann surface with some points missing; adding the
points yields the modular curve X(Γ). A modular form of weight 2 and level Γ is
a complex analytic function f(z) on H that is not quite invariant under Γ; rather
the differential form f(z)dz is invariant under Γ.
There is a procedure A for associating a Dirichlet series to such an f , and there
is also a procedure B for associating a Dirichlet series – Weil denotes it Λ – to an
3In the original German: “Aus gewissen theoretischen Gru¨nden darf man mit ziemlicher
Sicherheit vermuten.” The German admits more than one translation. The online dictionary
https://www.linguee.com/german-english/translation/ provides sentences in which mit ziemlicher
Sicherheit means “almost certainly.” Moreover, Vermutung is also the first and best-known Ger-
man equivalent of the English word conjecture, which leads one to wonder whether Weil was being
entirely sincere when in 1979 he argued against conjectures in general.
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elliptic curve E. Weil proves that any Dirichlet series that satisfies a property (A3)
– the “functional equations” (plural) of Weil’s title – arises from procedure A –
with specified level subgroup Γ – and alludes to “certain theoretical grounds” for
believing that the Dirichlet series arising from procedure B also satisfy property
(A3). This motivates the original suspicion, which I now present in full:
Aus gewissen theoretischen Gru¨nden darf man mit ziemlicher Sicherheit ver-
muten, dass Λ eine Funktionalgleichung besitzt... Weiter la¨sst sich vermuten [that
the functional equations of condition (A3) also hold upon twist by characters].
On the other hand, E can also be viewed as a Riemann surface, and there is a
stronger form of the conjecture:
Conjecture II. Any elliptic curve E with rational coefficients admits a modu-
lar parametrization: a non-trivial map of Riemann surfaces from X(Γ) to E,
again with specified Γ.
For nearly 20 years, such a map was called a Weil uniformization, in conferences
and seminars (including many that I attended) as well as in a number of influential
papers, reflecting the consensus that Weil had formulated an idea whose implica-
tions included the existence of such a map. But then things got more complicated.
ONE CONJECTURE, MANY NAMES
Actually, things were already more complicated within a few years of the pub-
lication of Weil’s papers, because it turned out that Yutaka Taniyama had listed
something very like Conjectures I and II as items 12 and 13 of a collection of 36
problems. This list was published in Japanese in his collected works, but it was
handed out in English at the 1955 Tokyo-Nikko conference on number theory, at-
tended by Weil, Shimura, and Jean-Pierre Serre,4 who also has a part to play in
this story. Great things were expected of Taniyama, but he committed suicide a
few years after 1955 and is now mainly remembered for the theory of complex
multiplication that he developed with Shimura, and for his part in formulating the
boldface statement Conjecture I, whose official name had become the Taniyama-
Weil Conjecture, no later than 1977. By then it was generally understood that the
statement would follow from the Langlands program, a vast and ambitious net-
work of conjectures and theorems that linked automorphic forms – generalizations
of modular forms – to generalizations of the number-theoretic structures derived
from elliptic curves. And it was generally believed that the Langlands program
was a distant fantasy, in large part because no one had any idea how to begin to
prove the (then-so-called) Taniyama-Weil Conjecture – which I will henceforth
call the Modularity Conjecture.
Positions hardened about halfway between the announcement by Frey and Ribet
that Fermat’s Last Theorem would be a consequence of the Modularity Conjecture,
4I am following Serge Lang’s account in “Some history of the Shimura-Taniyama Conjecture,”
Notices of the AMS, 42, November 1995, 1301–1307.
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and the announcement by Wiles of his proof (later completed in a paper of Taylor-
Wiles) of enough cases of the Modularity Conjecture to derive Fermat’s Last The-
orem. In February 1988, before Wiles announced his result, Joseph Oesterle´ had
published a Bourbaki seminar talk whose first theorem, attributed to Ken Ribet,
asserts that “La conjecture de Taniyama-Weil implique le the´ore`me de Fermat.”
No paper by Shimura was cited in Oesterle´’s bibliography. Ribet himself, writ-
ing in the United States two years later, published a paper in France with the title
“From the Taniyama-Shimura conjecture to Fermat’s last theorem,” in which his
reference to Weil’s 1967 paper draws attention to what he considered to be Weil’s
contribution to the story.
Finally, A. Weil proved in [35] that an elliptic curve E over Q is modular pro-
vided that its L-function L(E, s) has the analytic properties one expects of it.
Mathematicians’ choice of terminology for the conjecture largely broke down
along national lines, and remains contested nearly 20 years after a complete proof
of the Modularity Conjecture was published by Christophe Breuil, Brian Conrad,
Fred Diamond, and Richard Taylor.5 Public disputes over priority were acrimo-
nious on occasion, private disputes much more often. My own discomfort with
the situation, and my dissatisfaction with the quality of the arguments put forward
in support of one position or the other, led me to seek clarity and consolation in
philosophy. Thus, by a circuitous route, I find myself writing an article for a philo-
sophical journal∗ on the topic that revived my interest in philosophy in the first
place.
ONE CONJECTURE, MANY VIRTUES: COMPARING THE CASES FOR TANIYAMA,
SHIMURA, AND WEIL
In fact, although the difference of opinion had all the characteristics of a vulgar
personality conflict – it was common knowledge that relations between Serre and
Shimura were difficult, and the pages Shimura devotes to Serre in his memoirs
are so gratuitously nasty that one wonders why Springer-Verlag agreed to publish
them – arguments were advanced in support of each of the attributions. It is these
arguments that deserve to be evaluated for their implicit or explicit assumptions
about the virtues attributed to priority.
5Wikipedia is an international battleground. The English, German, French, Russian, and Arabic
pages are entitled “The Modularity Theorem” but disagree on its former terminology as conjec-
ture: in English and German it was the “Taniyama-Shimura Conjecture,” in Russian the “Taniyama-
Shimura-Weil,” and in French either “Taniyama-Weil,” “Shimura-Taniyama-Weil,” or “Shimura-
Taniyama.” (The Arabic page mentions Taniyama-Shimura-Weil “and other names.”) The Spanish,
Italian, Swedish, Hebrew, Catalan (and, as far as I can tell, the Chinese) pages are entitled “The
Taniyama-Shimura Theorem”; the Portuguese page call it the “Shimura-Taniyama-Weil Theorem”;
and the Dutch page is “The Shimura-Taniyama Theorem.” Wikipedia pages on mathematical topics
are generally maintained by mathematicians, who, as far as I know, do not report to their national
authorities. The proof by Breuil et al. is in the article “On the modularity of elliptic curves over Q:
wild 3-adic exercises”, Journal of the American Mathematical Society, 14 (4): 843–939 (2001).
∗The article was written in response to an invitation but was ultimately rejected by the journal,
for reasons to be discussed elsewhere.
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1. The case for Taniyama. By all accounts, Taniyama was the first to have ex-
pressed an expectation along the lines of the conjecture, in items 12 and 13 of his
list of problems at the Tokyo-Nikko conference. It is also agreed that his version
was not literally correct as stated.6 I copy the English translation of Taniyama’s
questions from Lang’s article in the AMS Notices:
2. The case for Shimura. (a) The case for Shimura’s priority was made by Lang
in his 1995 article: Lang established that Shimura had actually stated a version of
the conjecture in the presence of Serre and Weil, at a specific place (the Institute
for Advanced Study in Princeton) and during a specific time interval (“most likely
in 1964” , according to a private message7 Shimura sent me in 1998). Weil men-
tions this conversation in his 1979 comments on his 1967 article, included in his
collected works.8 The chronology is important for Lang, since the conversation
definitely took place before Weil published his result.
6This opinion is shared by Lang, Serre, and Shimura. In a letter to Lang, Shimura wrote that
Taniyama “was not completely careful, and if someone had pointed out this, he would have agreed
that the problem would have to be revised accordingly.”
7Shimura, private emails to the author, May 6-12, 1998.
8Weil, Oeuvres scientifiques, Vol III, p. 450.
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When I first read Weil’s answer about “one and the other set being denumer-
able, I characterized it as “stupid. I have since also called it inane. But actually,
Weil’s answer gives further evidence that he did not think of the conjecture himself.
Indeed, as a result of his conversations with Serre and Weil, Shimura was directly
responsible for changing the prevailing psychology about elliptic curves over
Q.9 [my emphasis; we will be returning to psychology]
(b) Shimura added two arguments that need to be considered separately. In
the first place, there is the important theorem that he first published in 1971 in his
textbook Introduction to the Arithmetic Theory of Automorphic Functions: namely,
that
Theorem (Shimura). To a modular form of weight 2 for Γ0(N) with rational
Fourier coefficients one can associate an elliptic curve with rational coeffi-
cients.
This is the evidence Weil cited in 1967 (as a Mitteilung from Shimura) and about
which he asks “whether things always behave that way.”
Twenty years ago, Shimura was attaching a great deal of importance to being
credited with the proof of this theorem. He was was unhappy with Wiles’s discus-
sion of this and a related point in one of his articles on FLT:
“Strangely Wiles says ‘Any such elliptic curve has the property... has an analytic
continuation ...’ without saying that the result is due to me. This is another defect.
Does he think that it is trivial?”10
(c) Shimura’s third argument is of a different nature again. In his remarks on
receiving the American Mathematical Society’s Steele Prize for Lifetime Achieve-
ment, Shimura explained his motivation:
...at first I thought that ... curves obtained from a division quaternion algebra B
over Q might not be modular... but I realized that no nonmodular Q-rational el-
liptic curves could be obtained for the following reason: Eichler had shown [that]
the Euler products on B are already included in those obtained from elliptic mod-
ular forms [2]. The Tate conjecture on this was explicitly stated much later, but
the idea was known to many people, and so it was natural for me to think that
two elliptic curves with the same zeta function are isogenous. This fact concerning
B, in addition to the results I had about the zeta functions of modular curves, may
have been the strongest reason for my stating the conjecture that every Q-rational
elliptic curve is modular.11 [my emphasis, to be explained later]
9Lang, p. 1304.
10Shimura, op. cit., May 11, 1998. In his letter to Serge Lang, February 14, 1999, appended to
this article, he refers to “one more annoying item” in Wiles’s article: “He attributes that statement to
nobody. I wonder if he considers it trivial. You may call it a non-reference by Wiles.”
The letter to Lang mainly complains that Wiles failed to appreciate the importance of the bold-
faced Theorem, and only mentions the result about analytic continuation in the final paragraph. This
observation could well serve as the starting point for an analysis of the virtues inherent in a new
theorem; but I don’t have enough information to reconstruct Shimura’s thoughts on the matter.
11Shimura, Notices of the AMS, November 1996, p. 1345.
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3. The case for Weil. Of course Weil gets credit for writing and publishing the pa-
per that includes his converse theorem, an insight at the basis of an entire research
program. A vast generalization of the converse theorem by James Cogdell and Ilya
Piatetski-Shapiro has been indispensable in 20 years of progress on the Langlands
program.
Weil may have remembered the conjecture on elliptic curves from that 1964
conversation with Shimura. This doesn’t strengthen the case for attaching his name
to the conjecture. But Weil’s paper included a major advance, already mentioned
above, on the previous versions of the conjecture: he suggested that an elliptic
curve E is a quotient of the Jacobian of the modular curve with level subgroup
Γ = Γ0(N), where N is an explicit integer, the conductor of E, defined in terms
of the arithmetic of E. This makes the conjecture considerably more precise: there
is an equivalence between two sets of objects that matches a specific numerical
property; moreover for a given N , the set of such objects is finite. Serre wrote
that this was a beautiful new idea ; it was not in Taniyama, nor in Shimura (as
Shimura himself wrote to me after Weil’s paper had appeared).” But he then added
an explicit value judgment:
Its importance comes from the fact that it made the conjecture checkable nu-
merically (while Taniyama’s statement was not). I remember vividly when Weil
explained it to me, in the summer of 1966, in some Quartier Latin coffee house.
Now things really began to make sense. Why no elliptic curve with conductor 1
(i.e. good reduction everywhere)? Because the modular curve X0(1) of level 1 has
genus 0, that’s why! I went home and checked a few examples of curves with low
conductor : I did not know any with conductor < 11 nor with conductor 16? No
surprise, since X0(N) has genus 0 for such values of N , etc. Within a few hours,
I was convinced that the conjecture was true.12
The virtue Serre identified in Weil’s formulation – that it lends itself to numerical
verification – has been taken up by defenders of the claim for Weil’s priority; most
of the defenders I know happen to be French.
“CONCEPTUAL EVIDENCE”
We should also hear what Andrew Wiles himself has to say about the origin of
the modularity conjecture. Wiles may have been thinking of the virtue mentioned
by Serre in the first page of his paper on Fermat’s Last Theorem:
A well-known conjecture which grew out of the work of Shimura and Taniyama
in the 1950’s and 1960’s asserts that every elliptic curve over Q is modular. How-
ever, it only became widely known through its publication in a paper of Weil in
1967..., in which, moreover, Weil gave conceptual evidence for the conjecture.
At the time, though, I understood that the “conceptual evidence” was the deriva-
tion of modularity from the characterization of modular forms given by Weil’s
12Jean-Pierre Serre, “L’histoire de la ‘modularity conjecture’”, Gazette des mathe´maticiens, 91,
Janvier 2002, 55–57.
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converse theorem, together with the Hasse conjecture, in Weil’s version (A3), and
the Tate conjecture, mentioned below.
It’s important to emphasize that all three protagonists – Taniyama, Shimura,
and Weil – justified their speculation in roughly the same terms. Taniyama’s 12th
problem includes the following sentence:
If a conjecture of Hasse is true ... then the Fourier series obtained from LC(s)
by the inverse Mellin transformation must be an automorphic form of dimension
−2, of some special type (cf. Hecke).
Shimura never published any version of his conjecture, but Lang reported in
1995 that
The rationale for Shimura’s conjecture was precisely the conjectured functional
equation (Hasse), along the lines indicated in Taniyama’s problem 12, suitably
corrected. Shimura’s bolder insight was that the ordinary modular functions ...
suffice to uniformize elliptic curves defined over the rationals.
Shimura confirmed this a few years later in a private communication.13 And
Hasse’s conjecture constituted the “certain theoretical grounds” [gewisse theoretis-
che Gru¨nde] to which Weil alluded (elliptically) in his paper. However, Hasse’s
conjecture alone would have indicated that the function LC(s) satisfied some func-
tional equation, but not necessarily the condition (A2) that had been shown by
Hecke to characterize modular forms. So Weil actually took his speculations to
the next step: “Weiter la¨sst sich vermuten”,14 as indicated above, that LC(s) sat-
isfies Weil’s condition (A3), which Serre thought added the necessary precision
to make the speculation of Taniyama and Shimura into a checkable and therefore
full-fledged conjecture.
DISCUSSION: NAMING VIRTUES
1. Taniyama’s clear and distinct idea. Taniyama’s reasoning follows a pattern
that is familiar to working mathematicians but that to my knowledge has not been
taken up by philosophers. “If a conjecture of Hasse is true,” he says, then some-
thing else must follow, because of Hecke’s well-known characterization of modular
13Shimura, unlike Wiles, did not see Weil’s paper as a conceptual breakthrough. In his e-mail to
me dated May 11, 1998, he wrote “‘Conceptual evidence’ is rather misleading. After all Taniyama
and I were familiar with the results of Hecke on the characterization of an automorphic form by the
functional equation of its Mellin transform, and our ideas were partly based on that correspondence.
I always viewed Weil’s result as its nice refinement. But “conceptual”? Really? I don’t get it.”
The word “conceptual” clearly continued to bother him, because in the letter to Serge Lang cited
in footnote 10, he complained vigorously about Wiles’s failure to understand his (Shimura’s) contri-
bution. Shimura sent me a copy of this letter and I have included a reproduction of the letter at the
end of this article. The letter to Lang makes it clear, however, that Shimura was especially annoyed
that Wiles and others failed to give him credit for the boldface Theorem cited above, under point (b)
of the case for Shimura, and which he calls a “geometric construction.”
14Hard to translate. On www.linguee.de one finds “it looks as if,” “it can be assumed that,” and
“suggests that” among the translations, depending on the context.
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forms. Taniyama’s 12th problem can be taken to be a sketch of a proof of a theo-
rem:
Taniyama’s “theorem”. If Hasse’s conjecture is true, then the L-function of any
elliptic curve over a number field k is an automorphic form of weight 2 of some
special type.
In more detail: (i) Hasse’s conjecture implies that LC(s) satisfies a functional
equation, and (ii) Hecke’s theorem then implies that LC(s) is the L-function of an
automorphic form. Step (ii) is false for at least two reasons: (a) Hecke’s theorem
only applies when k is the field of rational numbers, and (b) it only applies when
the conductor N is 1, which is never the case (a point Serre mentioned in the text
cited above). So the virtue of Taniyama’s contribution seems to involve the sketch
of an incorrect proof of an imprecisely stated and undoubtedly false theorem (see
(a)). The mistakes do not enhance the contribution, of course; the imprecise and
partially incorrect reasoning served as the basis of Taniyama’s imaginative leap,
making him the first to intuit an unexpected connection between elliptic curves
and modular forms.
The imaginative leap was not totally unprecedented. Dirichlet series with Eu-
ler products and functional equations arise in number theory in two ways. One
has to do with Galois theory, the other involves constructions in complex analysis
that can be interpreted as some sort of harmonic analysis on topological groups.15
Class field theory, the major accomplishment of algebraic number theory in the
first half of the 20th century, proves that both ways give rise to the same family
of Dirichlet series when the structures involved (the Galois groups and the topo-
logical groups) are both abelian. Taniyama can be credited with the insight that
something analogous is going on when the groups are not abelian. To the best of
my knowledge, this sort of insight is considered contingent and thus not suitable
as a topic for philosophical analysis. It is undoubtedly the most prized of all the
mathematical virtues, however, and for that reason alone deserves the attention of
anyone who is interested in mathematical practice. For example, the mathematical
community would see no virtue in the publication of a new speculative intuition
every week on the hope that one of them will turn out to be right. A new conjec-
ture not accompanied by a compelling motivation – what we might call a clear and
distinct idea – will win no credit for its author. In this respect the reasoning that
acoompanied Taniyama’s imaginative leap qualifies as cartesian in Ian Hacking’s
sense: any reader familiar with both Hasse’s conjecture and Hecke’s theorem will
immediately see the pertinence of Taniyama’s 12th problem.
The apparent importance of the cartesian character of Taniyama’s insight has
an apparently paradoxical implication that deserves to be stressed: there is more
virtue in Taniyama’s incorrect formulation of his 12th problem, accompanied as
15This perspective was already visible in Erich Hecke’s theory of L-functions of
Gro¨ssencharaktere, and was made systematic in John Tate’s influential thesis of 1950. Kenkichi
Iwasawa had independently discovered an essentially identical method slightly earlier. Although
Iwasawa never published his results and never wrote them up in detail in English, there has never
been a priority dispute.
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it was by steps (i) and (ii) above, than there would have on the counterfactual
assumption that he had presented with no justification whatsoever the fully-formed
and correct modularity conjecture, as later verified by Breuil-Conrad-Diamond-
Taylor. Something about this paradox feels wrong, but I am not sure what it is.
Of course, mathematicians generally show more appreciation for a conjecture
when it is accompanied by a proof, however un-cartesian it might be, than when it
is merely accompanied by a clear and distinct idea. Nevertheless, although Hack-
ing thought cartesian proofs are rare, I would argue that cartesian insights are fun-
damental to mathematical communication and progress. Everyone remembers that
Caesar crossed the Rubicon; only eyewitnesses and specialized historians remem-
ber the details of what happened when he got to the other side.
Before turning to the other two claimants to priority, I remind the reader that
the 13th problem on Taniyama’s list was a version of Conjecture II. I have alluded
indirectly to the possession of the “clear and distinct idea” underlying this intuition
on the part of each of the three protagonists. In Taniyama’s case, it is implicit
in the words “Concerning the above problem” that form the transition between
his problems 12 and 13, together with his use of the word “isogeneity.” This is a
basic concept in the theory of abelian varieties, a class of algebraic varieties to
which elliptic curves belong. An abelian variety is a projective algebraic variety
which is also an algebraic group – its group structure is given by algebraic maps.
To algebraic curve is canonically assigned an abelian variety called its Jacobian;
the Jacobian of the modular curve X(Γ) is denoted J(Γ). The theory of abelian
varieties is one of the best understood parts of algebraic geometry. In particular,
every abelian variety is a product of “simple factors” but only “up to isogeny.”
An isogeny between abelian varieties is an isomorphism up to finite error: it is
a surjective homomorphism of algebraic groups with finite kernel. Taniyama’s
problem 13 says the Jacobian J(Γ) for Γ of “stufe” N “contains” certain a elliptic
curve; by “contains” he means that it is one of its simple factors up to isogeny.
We have seen that an L-function can be attached to any elliptic curve, but in fact
Hasse’s conjecture (or the Hasse-Weil conjecture) concerns the L-function attached
to any algebraic variety. In particular, one can attach an L-function to an abelian
variety. It has been known for a long time that two isogenous abelian varieties have
the same L-function. Recall what Shimura wrote in 1996: it was natural for me to
think that two elliptic curves with the same zeta function are isogenous. For want of
a better account of the nature to which Shimura is referring here, let’s assume that
this “idea,” of which he claimed that it was “known to many people,” was “clear
and distinct” in their minds. It was this idea to which Weil alluded when we wrote
that it was “of course obvious – natu¨rlich naheliegend zu erwarten.” Here is the
full citation:
“It is of course obvious to expect that under these conditions C ′ [the elliptic
curve factor of the Jacobian attached to the modular form by Shimura] is isogenous
to C [the original elliptic curve that on “certain theoretical considerations” should
be modular]; this is in fact confirmed in some cases.” (Es ist natu¨rlich naheliegend
zu erwarten, da unter diesen Umsta¨nden C ′ mit C isogen ist; das besta¨tigt sich
tatsa¨chlich in einigen Fa¨llen.)
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With this in mind, problem 13 can be read in two ways. First, is it true that every
J(Γ) of “stufe” N has elliptic curves among their simple factors? This is the most
obvious reading of the text, but it is a strange question, because there are many
modular curves whose Jacobians do not involve any elliptic curves. The question
was given a precise answer by Shimura’s analysis of the Jacobians of modular
curves in his 1971 textbook.
The alternative reading is that every elliptic curve with rational coefficients is
isogenous to a factor of the Jacobian of some modular curve. This is now known
to be true, as a consequence of two very substantial theorems: the theorem of
Breuil-Conrad-Diamond-Taylor on the modularity of elliptic curves, and the 1983
theorem of Gerd Faltings that includes the Tate conjecture that Shimura had men-
tioned: that two abelian varieties over a number field whose L-functions coincide
are necessarily isogenous.16 This is the expectation that Shimura found “natural”
and Weil found “obvious,” once Conjecture I has been established. While one
needs a good deal of expertise and sophistication in order to perceive Conjecture
II as an obvious or natural consequence of Conjecture I and Tate’s Conjecture, the
choice of words suggests that neither Weil nor Shimura is claiming priority for this
particular aspect of the conjecture. So I will henceforth restrict my attention to
Conjecture I.
2. Lang’s realism, Shimura’s phenomenology. Lang’s case for Shimura’s pri-
ority is primarily forensic in nature: his detective work places Weil and Serre in
conversations with Shimura on this topic during a precise period in the early 1960s.
Weil and Serre were skeptical when Shimura asserted that he “believed [that an el-
liptic] curve [over Q] should always be a quotient of the Jacobian of a modular
curve” (both Conjectures I and II, in other words). Since Weil was not only a skep-
tic at the time but even responded in a way Lang characterized as “stupid” and
“inane,” how could anyone assign him any credit for the conjecture?
If Lang’s approach can be assigned to any philosophy, I would tend to call it em-
piricist and realist: to the extent that there is a fact of the matter (and Lang clearly
believes there is), it can be established by gathering evidence. But Lang made a
comment that calls this assignment into question: as we have seen, he claimed that
“Shimura was directly responsible for changing the prevailing psychology about el-
liptic curves over Q.” We can agree that something changed about the way number
16At some point in the 1980s I had the disconcerting experience of being asked by Shimura
whether or not it was true that Faltings had proved this theorem. Unfortunately, I don’t remember
whether it was before or after Faltings had joined Shimura in the Princeton mathematics department,
nor whether it was before or after the work of Frey and Ribet, around 1985-86, that showed how
Fermat’s Last Theorem would follow from the Modularity Conjecture, in view of Faltings’s theorem.
Either way, Shimura was surrounded by people who were far better qualified than I to answer his
question.
Tate’s conjectures on algebraic cycles, including the one about isogenies of abelian varieties that
Faltings proved, were made public in the 1960s. They are fundamental to our thinking about the
Galois representations attached to the l-adic cohomology of algebraic varieties, but I am not familiar
with their prehistory and cannot comment on why Taniyama, Shimura, and Weil found it “natural to
think” that it was valid for elliptic curves.
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theorists were thinking about elliptic curves over Q without commiting ourselves
to Lang’s use of the word “psychology,” nor do we have to accept his judgment that
Shimura had direct responsibility for the change by speaking with Weil and Serre.
Let’s say that we could ascribe to the community of number theorists the disposi-
tion to think about elliptic curves over Q in certain ways in 1960, and a markedly
different disposition in 1970. Then we can say that Lang counts among the prized
virtues of mathematical practice the ability to alter dispositions with regard to im-
portant topics, and that this is one of the main virtues he identifies in Shimura’s role
in proposing the modularity conjecture. This doesn’t suffice as a characterization
of Shimura’s contribution, however. Other distinguished number theorists, includ-
ing Barry Mazur, Yuri Manin, and especially John Tate, as well as Serre himself,
were busily altering dispositions with regard to elliptic curves overQ in the decade
following the publication of Weil’s article, by giving lectures and writing survey ar-
ticles17 promoting a very precise and detailed international research program that
continues to frame thinking about elliptic curves even now. One presumes that
they did so with dispositions altered as a direct result of Shimura’s intervention
with Serre and Weil a few years earlier – and, I should add, with Tate (“I told it to
Tate around the same time, and I remember that he was impressed.”18).
Lang is no longer among us, and we don’t know what he had in mind when
he refers to Shimura’s “changing the prevailing psychology.” My guess is that he
would like his readers to believe that Weil’s conversation with Shimura inspired
him to think about the questions that led to his 1967 paper, inviting us to inter-
pret his failure to mention either the contents of the conversation or Taniyama’s
1955 questions as a deliberate attempt to claim the virtue of the original idea of
Taniyama and Shimura for himself. That interpersonal conflict does not lend itself
to philosophical analysis, whereas “dispositions to think about” various mathemati-
cal objects can be legitimately understood as targets of virtuous intervention within
the community of mathematical practitioners. The dispositions, and the interven-
tions to change them, can thus be incorporated in a philosophy of mathematical
practice, whether or not Shimura’s private conversations were as effective as Lang
claimed. At the very least, this way of looking at things raises interesting questions
about the relative virtue of private and public interventions within the community –
and we should not underestimate the importance of the letters of recommendation
with which this essay began in creating dispositions in the first place.
Shimura’s own arguments (b) and (c) make no reference, explicit or otherwise,
to the community of mathematical practitioners. To put them in perspective, it’s
helpful to rewind to the early 1950s, when Hasse’s conjecture was known in very
few cases but was the basis of a very active research program. Weil, Taniyama,
and Shimura were reporting on their contributions to this program as early as the
1955 Tokyo-Nikko Conference, but their results (like those of Max Deuring, also
present at the conference) were based on what was already known about abelian
17Especially J. Tate, The arithmetic of elliptic curves, Invent. Math., 23 (1974), 179–206, which
is where I and everyone else I knew developed our dispositions at the time.
18Shimura, letter to the author, May 11, 1998.
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class field theory. The first non-abelian example had been treated in a 1954 article
by Martin Eichler. Shimura spent much of the next 20 years generalizing Eichler’s
observation and creating what is now called (following Pierre Deligne) the theory
of Shimura varieties, of which the simplest (but by no means simple) case is the
one treated in his 1971 textbook. In that book, and in a series of papers dating back
to 1958, Shimura developed a systematic method for verifying new non-abelian
cases of Hasse’s conjecture for elliptic curves, in the process providing evidence
for both Conjectures I and II. Lang puts it this way:
Shimura himself in the late fifties and sixties extended Eichler’s results and
proved that elliptic curves which are modular have zeta functions which have an
analytic continuation. (Cf. the three papers [Sh 58], [Sh 61], and [Sh 67].)19
Thirty years earlier, this had already been mentioned in a survey article of J.W.S.
Cassels that was largely responsible for creating the “prevailing psychology” about
elliptic curves in the 1960s:
Hasse’s conjecture has also been verified for a few C without complex multi-
plication which arise in the theory of modular functions [Shimura (1958a, 1961a,
1964a)]20
What should we call the virtue, exemplified by this evidence, on which Shimura
bases his claim (b) to priority? Wikipedia suggests one possible name:
Shimura’s approach, later presented in his monograph, was largely phenomeno-
logical, pursuing the widest generalizations of the reciprocity law formulation of
complex multiplication theory.[my emphasis]21
Wikipedia’s history page informs me that on March 31, 2007, Charles Matthews
inserted the word that I have set in boldface, together with its philosophical over-
tones. The word is not used in Husserl’s sense but rather as it is understood in
philosophy of science. Shimura developed the theory in order to establish the facts
of the matter.22 In the course of this development, he made the observation re-
ported above in argument (c): that the phenomena (elliptic curves) observed in his
study of the Shimura varieties attached to quaternion division algebras provided
additional evidence for Conjectures I and II.
Thus Shimura claimed the virtue that Matthews calls phenomenological. As
he himself acknowledged, it built upon Taniyama’s original cartesian insight, but
from the standpoint of philosophical analysis it is conveniently different. Neverthe-
less, I don’t want to leave Shimura without pointing out that mathematical practice
sees an unbridgeable gulf between providing (phenomenological) evidence for a
conjecture and proving the conjecture. This is obvious, of course, and since no one
19Lang, p. 1303.
20Cassels, J. W. S., Diophantine equations with special reference to elliptic curves. J. London
Math. Soc., 41 (1966) p. 280.
21Wikipedia, “Shimura variety,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimura variety
22A Wikipedia editor named Arcfrk emphasized (in 2010) the contrast with Deligne’s definition,
which served “to isolate the abstract features that played a role in Shimura’s theory.”
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is claiming that any of the triad (Taniyama, Shimura, Weil) came close to proving
the conjecture, its relevance to identifying the virtues of a conjecture may not be
clear. This may best be understood a posteriori, in the light of the Langlands pro-
gram for automorphic forms, specifically the program Langlands outlined in 1979
for the study of Shimura varieties. During the 1960s, Alexander Grothendieck and
his school had developed the theory of e´tale cohomology, which made it possible
to attach Dirichlet series to automorphic forms in both of the ways mentioned pre-
viously. E´tale cohomology provided the connection with Galois theory, while the
relation to representation theory – what we previously called harmonic analysis on
topological groups – gave a variety of constructions of Dirichlet series. The gener-
alization of Conjecture I (no uniform generalization is possible for Conjecture II)
asserts roughly that
A. Galois-theoretic Dirichlet series are representation-theoretic Dirichlet series.
Specialists call this the “Galois-to-automorphic” direction of Langlands’s con-
jectures; current work on this direction largely derives from the methods Wiles
developed in his proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem. The “automorphic-to-Galois”
direction, naturally, asserts
B. Representation-theoretic Dirichlet series are Galois-theoretic Dirichlet series.
Shimura’s phenomenological efforts established B for the class of modular forms
that is relevant to elliptic curves with rational coefficients, and provided the starting
point for all subsequent work on B, which by now is established in considerable
(though by no means complete) generality. But it’s not immediately obvious why
even a complete proof of B should help to establish a disposition to believe A, as it
apparently did for Shimura.
Shimura actually did prove A – Conjecture I for the class of elliptic curves with
complex multiplication – in a paper published in 1973.23 Even though this class of
elliptic curves has especially favorable properties (the problem in this case is very
close to being abelian), phenomenological results of this kind typically do count as
significant evidence for A within the framework of the Langlands program, since it
is generally believed that we will have to wait several generations, if not centuries,
for a complete proof of A.
3. Weil’s falsificationism, on Serre’s reading. Unlike some of his Bourbaki col-
leagues, Serre has never displayed an interest in philosophy for its own sake, but
the virtue he discerns in Weil’s contribution to the conjecture is the easiest to trans-
late into familiar philosophical terms. If we replace the word “checkable” with
its synonym “verifiable,” then Weil’s virtue, according to Serre, is that he has en-
dowed the Modularity Conjecture with a meaning, following the logical positivist
23Goro Shimura, On the factors of the jacobian variety of a modular function field, J. Math. Soc.
Japan, 25 (1973), 523–544. This theorem can be proved using Weil’s converse theorem, but this
was not the method Shimura chose, although his paper on modular forms of half-integral weight,
published the same year, was based on a highly original application of Weil’s 1967 paper.
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dictum that (in the words of Schlick) “The meaning of a proposition is the method
of its verification.”24 In practice, though, falsification of the Modularity Conjecture
by finding a counter-example would have carried more weight than its verification
in special cases, if for no other reason than that a proof by (philosophical rather
than mathematical) induction would require infinitely many verifications, which
is impossible, whereas a single counter-example suffices for disproof. Thus the
virtue Serre highlights may just as well be popperian. Either way, by insisting on
the virtue of making a conjecture “checkable,” Serre seems to be in agreement with
Mach, when he asserted that “where neither confirmation nor refutation is possible,
science is not concerned.”25
The clarity of Serre’s argument simplifies the philosopher’s task; he has iden-
tified a virtue in conjecture-making that is both unambiguous and easy to map
onto familiar concerns in the philosophy of science. I would go further and say
that Serre has rendered a service to philosophy: while both the verificationism of
the logical positivists and Popper’s falsificationism are known to be vulnerable to
critique, on the grounds that there is more to the world than its logical Aufbau,
Serre’s “checkability” may well be a viable criterion for the meaningfulness of a
conjecture. At any rate, it has not been subject to philosophical analysis.
Most importantly, perhaps, Serre has shown some consistency in following his
own dictum: Serre formulated his famous Conjecture on modular representations
of Galois groups in 1973 but only published it in 1987, after, as he put it in his
thanks,
Jean-Franois Mestre ...a re´ussi a` programmer et ve´rifier un nombre d’exemples
suffisant pour me convaincre que la conjecture me´ritait d’eˆtre prise au se´rieux.26
The examples occupy 11 of the 52 pages of his manuscript.
CONCLUSION: THE “PREVAILING PSYCHOLOGY”
Lang indirectly hinted at a model of the mathematical subject by assigning to
Shimura direct responsibility “for changing the prevailing psychology” by pri-
vately conveying his belief in the truth of what we are calling the Modularity Con-
jecture to two or three individuals. This subject is structured hierarchically, so that
impressions acquired by those (like Weil, Serre, or Tate) at the pinnacle of the hi-
erarchy have the power of detectably altering dispositions throughout the subject.
Lang doesn’t explain the means of this alteration, so we don’t know the relative
weight in the process of private exchanges, seminar presentations, or publications
24Moritz Schlick, “Meaning and verification,” The Philosophical Review, 45, No. 4 (Jul., 1936),
339-369.
25Mach, Ernst, 1883, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, Leipzig: Brockhaus, 9th ed. transl. by
T.J. McCormick, The Science of Mechanics, Chicago: Open Court, 1960, p. 587.
26Jean-Pierre Serre, Sur les repre´sentations modulaires de degre´ 2 de Gal(Q/Q), Duke Math-
ematical Journal, 54 (1): (1987) p. 180. Its proof some 20 years later, by Chandrashekhar Khare
and Jean-Pierre Wintenberger, made extensive use of the methods introduced by Wiles, Taylor, and
others in proving the Modularity Conjecture, to which Serre’s conjecture is very closely related.
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– just to mention the mechanisms with which most members of the community
would be familiar.
But even granting that the dispositions of a collective subject can be altered as
a result of a few brief conversations involving a group of exceptionally influential
individuals, the question remains: why should there have been a “psychology about
elliptic curves over Q” in the first place? Whether or not there is a virtue ethics
for mathematics, in which every conceivable topic merits its own psychology, in
practice the attention of the mathematical subject is rather narrowly focused. Why
were elliptic curves so much on the minds of number theorists in the 1960s?
It’s easier to understand this attention when we remember that number theory
at its core is concerned with understanding Diophantine equations – polynomial
equations in several variables with integer coefficients– and more specifically with
characterizing their set of solutions in integers, or in rational numbers. Equation
(*) that we encountered at the beginning of the article, the one whose solution set is
an elliptic curve, is a Diophantine equation – it is the simplest possible Diophantine
equation whose theory has not been fully understood since the 19th century (if not
longer) – and yet the nature of its solution set remains an outstanding open ques-
tion. Much was known by the 1960s, however. It was proved by L. E. J. Mordell
nearly 100 years ago that its set of rational solutions forms a finitely generated
abelian group, a result generalized in Andre´ Weil’s thesis and now known as the
Mordell-Weil Theorem. This landmark in number theory, arguably the deepest re-
sult known at the time about Diophantine equations, posed a challenge to number
theorists: how many generators does the group have? And how can we tell whether
the group is infinite or finite? The challenge was more acute in view of the special
status of elliptic curves among all algebraic curves27 with rational coefficients. Ev-
ery such curve has a genus, a non-negative integer; elliptic curves are the curves of
genus 1. The rational solutions of curves of genus 0 – like the circle with equation
x2 + y2 = 1 – are well understood (rational points on the circle are essentially the
same as right triangles with integer sides). The Mordell Conjecture – proved by
Faltings in 1983 – is the statement that curves of genus 2 have only finitely many
solutions. For elliptic curves, simple as they are, there is no elementary way to
determine whether the (rational) solution set is finite or infinite.
But in the early 1960s, when Shimura was privately conversing in Princeton
with Weil, Serre, and Tate, over in England Bryan Birch and H. P. F. Swinnerton-
Dyer were busy formulating and testing a conjectural answer to the question. The
Birch-Swinnerton-Dyer (BSD) Conjecture – the appropriateness of its name has
never been called into question! – asserts that the number of generators of the
group of rational points of the elliptic curve C can be determined by examining its
associated Dirichlet series – Taniyama’s LC(s), Weil’s Λ – but only if the Dirichlet
series had (at least some of) the properties conjectured by Hasse.
27For our present purposes, an algebraic curve is defined by an equation in two variables, like (*).
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The (eminently checkable) BSD Conjecture, which was widely known28 by the
time Weil’s article was published, gave such an appealing answer to the questions
raised by the Mordell-Weil Theorem that one can easily understand why number
theorists wanted the Conjecture to be meaningful – and thus for Hasse’s conjectures
to be true for elliptic curves, and thus for Taniyama’s “theorem” to be true. With the
help of the BSD Conjecture, the Modularity Conjecture thus becomes an object of
number theorists’ collective desire – a symptom of our mass psychology, as Lang
intuited.29
28Thanks to the 1966 article by Cassels cited in note 20, and of course to lectures by Birch and
Swinnerton-Dyer themselves, especially the latter’s chapter in the book Algebraic Number Theory
edited by Cassels and A. Frhlich London: Academic Press (1967) which for 50 years has been
required reading for every student of number theory.
29The importance of the BSD Conjecture in promoting the Modularity Conjecture is beyond the
scope of this article, but two landmark articles written in the decades following the publication of
Weil’s paper give a sense of the excitement it generated. The introduction to “Arithmetic of Weil
Curves”, by Mazur and Swinnerton-Dyer, published in 1974 (but available several years earlier) ex-
plicitly identifies the “aim of Part I of this paper”: to “examine... structures” that are “associated
to the Weil parametrization and the bearing they have (via the conjectures of Birch and Swinnerton-
Dyer) on the arithmetic” of elliptic curves overQ. Part II as well as Part I became instantly applicable
to all elliptic curves over Q with the proof of the Modularity Conjecture. In 1983 Benedict Gross
and Don Zagier announced their proof of their famous formula the first that explicitly constructs
infinitely many rational points on an elliptic curve using information about its Dirichlet series. Since
the Modularity Conjecture was not yet established, their article (published in 1986, before the con-
troversy over priority broke out) explains that the results apply to “strong Weil curves” and refer to
the Mazur-Swinnerton-Dyer article for the terminology. B. Mazur and H. P. F. Swinnerton-Dyer,
Arithmetic of Weil Curves, Inventiones Math., 25 (1974) 1–61; B. Gross and D. Zagier, Heegner
points and derivatives of L-series, Inventiones Math. 84 (1986) 225–320.
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